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Redistributive Taxation and Personal
Bankruptcy in U.S. States
Charles Grant University of Reading
Winfried Koeniger Queen Mary University of London
Abstract
Personal bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers vary con-
siderably across U.S. states and over time. Our hypothesis is that both policies
are imperfect substitutes in insuring consumption of risk-averse agents in in-
complete markets. Exploiting data variation over time for 18 U.S. states for the
period 1980–2003, we find considerable support for this hypothesis: redistrib-
utive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions are negatively correlated, and both
policies are associated with more equal consumption growth.
1. Introduction
The volume of consumer credit, in part unsecured, has increased substantially
in the last decades in the United States, and some borrowers of unsecured debt
end up defaulting on their debts. Roughly 1.5 percent of U.S. households have
filed for personal bankruptcy in each recent year and defaulted on approximately
$120 billion in 2003, or $1,100 per household (see White 2006).1 At the same
time, the average prime-age U.S. household, with a household head between the
ages of 30 and 60, received $1,000 in direct transfers per year (see Table 1).
Hence, both bankruptcy regulation and redistributive taxes and transfers are
important policies that affect U.S. households.
Besides the aggregate importance of both policies, there is substantial variation
in the regulation of bankruptcy and redistributive taxes and transfers across U.S.
states. For example, bankruptcy exemptions—the assets that may be kept by the
debtor when he defaults on his debt—are generous in Texas where housing
property is fully exempt regardless of value (although subject to an acreage limit)
but redistribution through taxes and transfers is less pronounced. In contrast,
Koeniger is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. We thank
the editor Sam Peltzman, an anonymous referee, Giuseppe Bertola, Burcu Duygan, Hamish Low,
Michelle White, Justin Wolfers, and participants at various conferences and seminars for very helpful
comments.
1 Empirical data on household portfolios show that bankruptcy is financially attractive for many
U.S. households. See White (1998).
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Table 1
Levels of Wages and Transfers (in 1984 Dollars) for Prime-Age Households in the Sample
Average Average If Received % Who Receive
Wages 34,696 36,789 94.3
Social security 261 6,601 3.9
Supplementary security income 77 4,161 1.8
Unemployment or workers compensation 353 2,688 13.1
Public assistance or welfare 176 3,712 4.7
Food stamps 128 1,571 8.1
Total transfer 997 4,250 23.4
Source. Authors’ calculations using reported responses in the 1980–2003 March supplements of the Current
Population Survey (CPS), excluding the self-employed, farmers, and heads of households over age 60 or
under age 30.
Note. Total transfer is the sum of social security benefits, supplementary security benefits, unemployment
or workers compensation, welfare or other public assistance, and food stamps. The CPS questionnaire
conflates social security benefits with railroad retirement income and workers compensation with veterans
payments.
New York allows for much smaller bankruptcy exemptions but has a more
generous redistribution scheme through taxes and transfers.
This paper argues that there is a simple economic explanation for this negative
correlation between the two policies. If markets are incomplete (for empirical
evidence, see, for example, Attanasio and Davis 1996; Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston 2008), both policies help households to insure some of the income
fluctuations that they are not otherwise able to insure. Both personal bankruptcy
and redistributive taxes are attractive for agents in this second-best world, but
the net benefits of each policy are reduced in the presence of the other. This is
far from obvious since the bankruptcy exemption is crucially associated with
intertemporal consumption smoothing (it is important only if agents save and
borrow across time), whereas this is not the case for redistributive tax and transfer
schemes. While, in principle, a tax system could be devised that replicates the
redistribution implied by a bankruptcy law, this is not practically possible since
it would require conditioning taxes and transfers on those who would otherwise
default. For this, the government would need to know not only a household’s
current asset position but also information on consumption and saving, requiring
knowledge of discount rates and expected future income.
Bankruptcy provides a fresh start for agents who have been hit by a sufficiently
bad shock (see, for example, Rhea 1984; Jackson 2001; Hynes 2002). Bankruptcy
provides insurance at a cost, however, since households receiving bad shocks
can default, while households without bad shocks repay at higher interest rates.
We argue that redistributive taxes and transfers make the fresh start less attractive
because they eliminate some of the ex post inequality in gross income. Moreover,
redistributive taxation decreases agents’ expected differences in income across
time and thus their desire to borrow. Besides these intuitive and straightforward
mechanisms, even a very simple model points to more subtle interactions, as
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both policies affect the bankruptcy decision and thus how banks price lending
to households.2
The important contribution of this paper is that we provide empirical evidence
on our hypothesis using data for 18 U.S. states over a long time period,
1980–2003. We construct new data on bankruptcy exemptions in these states
for our sample period. We combine these data with measures for redistributive
taxes and transfers and consumption data using the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) and the Current Population Survey (CPS).3 Since all our data have
time variation, we can control for state-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis. We find that the generosity
of the bankruptcy exemption and the extent of redistributive taxes and transfers
are negatively correlated, which suggests that both policies are substitutes in
providing consumption insurance. Indeed, we find that both the bankruptcy
exemption and redistributive taxation are associated with less inequality in con-
sumption growth, which directly measures consumption insurance.
Of course, we are not the first to analyze bankruptcy or redistributive taxation
in the United States.4 For example, Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) and Pavan
(2005) investigate the effect of personal bankruptcy procedures on households’
assets, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) provide empirical evidence on the impor-
tance of exemptions for bankruptcy decisions, while Zame (1993) shows theo-
retically how bankruptcy can provide partial insurance against income fluctu-
ations. In the context of the recent bankruptcy reforms, Athreya (1999, 2006),
Athreya and Simpson (2006), and Chatterjee et al. (2007) calibrate numerical
models to gauge how the benefits of bankruptcy compare with the costs, such
as higher interest rates.5 It is also well known that redistributive taxation provides
partial insurance if financial markets are incomplete (see the seminal paper of
Varian [1980] and the empirical evidence in Grant et al. [2008] and their
references).
To the best of our knowledge, however, this paper is the first to jointly analyze
the redistributive tax and transfer system and bankruptcy exemptions empirically.
The evidence of Fisher (2005), for instance, focuses only on one interesting part
of the policy interaction to show that more generous unemployment insurance
is negatively associated with the probability of declaring bankruptcy, using the
rather few observations on bankrupt households in the Panel Study of Income
2 For a stylized model that shows under what conditions both policies are substitutes in providing
partial insurance to consumers, see Grant and Koeniger (2008).
3 We use income information in the Current Population Survey rather than the Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey (CEX) (which is used for consumption) because of the larger survey size, so that
state averages are better measured. Moreover, measurement error in income and in consumption
will be uncorrelated if information is obtained from different surveys.
4 Whereas the bankruptcy and credit of firms, taxes, and entrepreneurial risk taking have received
attention (for example, Berkowitz and White [2004] and Cullen and Gordon [2007] and their
references), there has been less research into the effects of these policies on the risk sharing of
households.
5 See also the analyses of Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Bertola and Koeniger (2007) on
interactions between government redistribution and financial market imperfections.
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Dynamics in the 1990s. The most important difference in our empirical work
is that we are interested in directly quantifying the association of bankruptcy
exemptions and redistributive taxes and transfers with consumption insurance.
In order to have a sufficient sample size for U.S. states, we use CEX and CPS
data that are repeated cross-sectional but for the 1-year panel component in the
CEX. Furthermore, we construct a new measure for bankruptcy exemptions and
a comprehensive measure for redistribution in terms of taxes and transfers that
vary across both time and U.S. states.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
theoretical background. We describe the data and the consumer bankruptcy law
in Section 3. We discuss the econometric specification in Section 4 and present
our empirical results in Section 5 before we conclude in Section 6.
2. Theoretical Background
In this section we discuss the theoretical background that is useful to under-
stand the empirical analysis (for a more formal analysis, see Grant and Koeniger
2008).
2.1. Consumption Insurance in a Given Period
Suppose that an agent receives an uncertain endowment and cannot fully
insure that risk in markets. Instead, there are two policies that can partially
insure the agent: bankruptcy with a level of exempt resources that cannot be
touched by banks in case of bankruptcy (the exemption level), or redistributive
taxes and transfers.
While it is obvious how taxes and transfers, which redistribute resources from
good to bad states, can provide consumption insurance, this deserves some
explanation for personal bankruptcy. The possibility of bankruptcy with a positive
exemption level implies that agents find it optimal to declare bankruptcy if their
endowment falls below a critical threshold. This critical threshold is endogenous
and increases as the level of exempt assets rises. Higher exemption levels thus
provide insurance for a larger range of endowments below that threshold, as the
consumer can afford more consumption when he keeps his exempt resources
and does not repay his debt. This insurance comes at a cost if the consumer’s
endowment is above the critical threshold. In equilibrium, the consumer pays
higher interest on debt, as banks must be compensated for the higher default
risk ex ante.
With concave utility, one would expect that redistributive taxes and transfers
and bankruptcy exemptions are imperfect substitutes in generating insurance in
a given period. More consumption in bad states of the world (due to either
transfers or bankruptcy exemptions) raises expected utility, but with strictly
concave utility the marginal utility gain is lower if more is already redistributed
toward these states. The interaction between the two policies, however, is a bit
more subtle since redistributive taxes and transfers not only lower the marginal
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direct benefit of bankruptcy exemptions but also change the threshold at which
agents declare bankruptcy and thus the cost of the bankruptcy exemption in
terms of higher interest rates.6
2.2. Beyond One Period
Bankruptcy exemptions and redistributive taxation not only interact in terms
of providing insurance in a given period. Redistributive taxation can eliminate
part of the intertemporal inequality of resources and thus the borrowing motive.
Less borrowing obviously makes bankruptcy less important for insurance pur-
poses. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether redistributive taxes or
transfers and bankruptcy exemptions are imperfect substitutes in providing con-
sumption insurance in incomplete markets.7 We now provide empirical evidence
for the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Redistributive taxes and transfers as well as bankruptcy ex-
emptions provide some consumption insurance.
We test this prediction by estimating the association of changes in both policies
with the standard deviation of consumption growth, which is a measure of
consumption insurance.
Hypothesis 2. Consumption insurance provided by exemptions is less val-
uable if redistribution through taxes and transfers is more pronounced.
We test this empirically by investigating whether changes in both policies in U.S.
states are negatively correlated.
It is important to note that in our empirical analysis we condition on the
initial policies in all U.S. states since we include state fixed effects. Thus, we
exploit the time variation of these policies to estimate the coefficients of interest.
3. Data
We have described the interaction between redistributive taxation and the level
of bankruptcy exemptions in providing consumption insurance in incomplete
markets. We now search for empirical evidence exploiting the variation in the
two policies in different U.S. states between 1980 and 2003. We construct a panel
of state-year cells using household data from the CEX and from the CPS.8 As
relatively few households are sampled in some states in the CEX, our sample
6 These interactions are derived more formally in Grant and Koeniger (2008).
7 Clear qualitative predictions are even harder to make if one considers the persistence of shocks.
On the one hand, more persistent shocks increase the benefit from declaring bankruptcy ex post,
but on the other hand, the costs of debt ex ante will also increase as banks price this risk. Our data
do not allow us to explore the interaction of shock persistence and the insurance provided by both
policies.
8 Data limitations do not allow an analysis of household-level data. Available household panel data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) have too small a sample to investigate differences
across states and time.
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contains only households in the 18 largest U.S. states, which nevertheless cover
the full range of U.S. states in terms of geography, taxes and transfers, and
bankruptcy exemptions.9 The states thus included are California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
For our analysis, we need to summarize taxes and transfers, bankruptcy ex-
emptions, and consumption in each state and year. When constructing these
measures, we apply the same sample selection criteria. We restrict the sample to
those households with complete state information and a head of household who
is between 30 and 60 years old. Farming households are excluded since they
have their own bankruptcy regulations. As is frequently done in the literature,
we also exclude the self-employed since differences between business and per-
sonal income are hard to distinguish for these households. Furthermore, we are
interested in consumers’ risk and not entrepreneurial risk, and self-employed
households have motivations for borrowing other than consumption smoothing.
3.1. Consumption
We use the CEX to construct a measure of nondurable consumption and debt
for each household. The survey is constructed as a rotating panel in which
households are interviewed five times at quarterly intervals (although no infor-
mation is reported for the first interview). Each quarter, households that have
reached their fifth interview are replaced. The CEX contains extremely detailed
information on the individual items of consumer spending as well as demo-
graphic and other characteristics, including the state of residence. Consumption
growth for the households is calculated as the difference in log nondurable
consumption in the second and fifth interviews.
We use the standard deviation of consumption (measured in 1984 dollars)
and consumption growth within a state-year cell as measures for consumption
insurance. The standard deviation of consumption measures the cross-sectional
level of consumption inequality. This is a rather imperfect way to proxy con-
sumption insurance because it does not distinguish between ex ante and ex post
inequality. Deaton and Paxson (1994) note, however, that if markets are complete,
then the cross-sectional distribution of consumption inequality should not
change over time for a fixed-membership group. A useful corollary is that this
cross-sectional measure should increase if markets are incomplete, as Deaton
and Paxson find for the United States. Moreover, if shocks are the same across
groups, the rate at which this inequality changes over time should be larger for
those groups in which there is less risk sharing. While Deaton and Paxson look
at the change in the cross section of consumption inequality, the same impli-
cations arise for the standard deviation of consumption growth: in complete
markets, consumption should change for all households by the same amount.
9 This consideration also precludes analyzing finer subgroups of the population within each state.
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Hence, if consumption is growing by different amounts for different households
so the variance of consumption growth is positive, then we can again reject the
hypothesis of full insurance. Moreover, markets provide less insurance if the
variance of consumption growth is larger.10
3.2. Income
We use the March supplement of the CPS to obtain information on household-
level (labor) income and transfers (which include social security and railroad
retirement income, supplementary security income, unemployment compensa-
tion, workers compensation and veterans payments, public assistance or welfare,
and the value of food stamps received). This survey, managed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, reports extremely detailed information on income as well as the
households’ other characteristics. Table 1 shows that nearly 95 percent of house-
holds in our sample receive some wage income, which averages almost $35,000.
On average, households also receive nearly $1,000 in transfers (over $4,000
among the quarter of households who receive at least some transfer).
Using the CPS income data rather than the CEX data to construct measures
for redistribution through taxes and transfers has several advantages. The CPS
is a larger survey, hence cell averages are measured more precisely and the small-
sample bias is reduced. Moreover, if both consumption and income are taken
from the same sample, measurement error would affect the dependent variable
as well as the regressor in some of the specifications estimated below. This would
bias the estimates, with an ambiguous sign of the bias. Constructing the cell
averages using different data sets circumvents this problem.
3.3. Redistribution through Taxes and Transfers
To measure the level of income taxes and transfers that each household pays
or receives, we use the data from the CPS and exploit the TAXSIM 4.0 program
developed by Feenberg (see Feenberg and Coutts 1993) that is available from
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).11 The program TAXSIM
uses a variety of household variables, including the husband’s and wife’s earnings,
interest, dividend and other income, and information about the household’s
characteristics (such as the number of dependent children) and other deductibles
(such as property costs) as inputs to calculate both the state and federal tax
brackets, tax liability, and marginal tax rate for each household in the sample.
It explicitly controls for a variety of allowances to which the household is entitled.
10 Households in the CEX also report unsecured debt. The last column of Table 3 shows that the
median household in all states has unsecured debts (the mean level of unsecured debt that households
report is $2,151), which suggests that the bankruptcy exemptions are relevant for most U.S.
households.
11 We concentrate on income taxes that are raised at both the federal and state levels and exclude
property and sales taxes in our measures of the tax system since they are largely levied at the county,
school board, or city levels, which we cannot identify in our data. Note that the expenditures recorded
in the CEX also exclude sales taxes.
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Table 2
Income Thresholds for 1998 Federal Tax Brackets
Tax Rate (%)
Tax Bracket ($)
Households
(%)Single Married Filing Jointly Married Filing Separately
15 0 0 0 58.2
28 26,250 43,850 21,925 34.2
31 63,550 105,950 52,975 5.2
36 132,660 161,450 80,725 1.8
39.6 288,350 288,350 144,175 .3
Source. Authors’ compilation using data from Federation of Tax Administrators (444 North Capital Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001).
Note. The amounts for the tax bracket refer to the income at which the tax bracket starts.
Both federal and state taxes vary considerably across time and between house-
holds, and states set very different marginal tax rates and allowances. Table 2
displays the federal tax rates for 1 year in our sample, 1998. For example, the
federal income tax rate in 1998 was 15 percent for single filers whose income
was below $26,250 (the lowest tax bracket and the rate paid by nearly 60 percent
of households) but increased in steps to 39.6 percent for those whose income
was over $288,350. The brackets nearly doubled for couples filing jointly (each
partner halved this allowance if filing separately) and vary substantially from
year to year. Prior to 1996, the rate in the bottom bracket was set at zero, which
meant that between 15 and 20 percent of low-income households paid no federal
income tax.
There is also considerable variation in state income taxes. Eight U.S. states,
including Texas and Florida, levy no state income tax. The other states have a
variety of income tax brackets of differing progressivity. In most states the marginal
tax rate increases with income. This is shown for a subset of states in the first,
second, and third columns in Table 3. In California, for example, the tax rate is
1 percent in the lowest tax bracket and 9.3 percent in the highest bracket. Many
states have tax allowances (which depend on whether the taxpayer has a spouse
or other dependents), which can sometimes be quite large: Minnesota, for example,
allows the first $2,900 to be exempt for single filers. Some states set a flat rate tax,
however, without allowances: in Pennsylvania this rate is 2.8 percent.
It is possible to construct several alternative measures of the tax and transfer
system that account for both federal and state income taxes and (in our preferred
measure) for transfers. One measure is the mean marginal tax rate, which is
often used to compare different tax systems (for instance, this measure is ex-
tensively summarized by Feenberg on the TAXSIM Web site at the NBER).12
Table 3 shows that tax rates vary across some of the largest U.S. states for our
sample (which restricts attention to those cases in which the head of the house-
hold is 30–60 years old). Texas and Florida have the lowest mean marginal tax
rates, 19 percent, since they levy no state income tax and households pay only
12 Daniel Feenberg, TAXSIM Related Files at the NBER (http://www.nber.org/∼taxsim).
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federal income tax. The mean marginal tax rates are higher in Maryland and
Minnesota, at around 25 percent, reflecting the higher level of state income tax.
The commonly used mean marginal tax rate, however, is rather unattractive
since it does not capture the substantial heterogeneity in marginal tax rates across
households in each year even in the same state. For example, a mean marginal
tax rate of 20 percent could be due to a uniform marginal tax rate of 20 percent,
to the top 20 percent of the population having a rate of 100 percent and the
rest of the population having a rate of zero, or to the bottom 20 percent having
a 100 percent tax rate and the top 80 percent paying nothing. These three tax
schedules have substantially different implications for redistribution. Moreover,
the mean marginal tax rate ignores the level of transfers that households receive.
Thus, we construct a more direct measure of how much the tax system redis-
tributes income, which we call the income compression measure:
SD (income  tax liability  transfers )st ist ist ist
1 ,
SD (income )st ist
where SD denotes the standard deviation, i the household, s the state, and t the
year. This income compression measure compares the inequality in net and gross
incomes for each state s and year t. If the inequality in net and gross incomes
were the same (for example, if all households paid the same lump-sum tax), the
measure would take the value of zero. If instead there were no inequality in net
income but some inequality in gross income, the measure would take the value
of one. Thus, increasing the amount of redistribution through taxes and transfers
decreases the inequality in net income compared with gross income and increases
the income compression measure of the tax system.13 Table 3 shows that Texas
and Florida again have the lowest level of redistribution using the new measure
while the index is now highest in New York, Minnesota, and California. The
ordering of states, however, is similar for the income compression measure and
for the mean marginal tax rate (the correlation between the two measures is
.78). Given the substantial heterogeneity in marginal tax rates and in transfers
across households, we prefer the income compression measure.14
3.4. Bankruptcy Exemptions
Using legislative data, we construct the bankruptcy exemption level for each
household in the CEX sample. To understand the variation in the data, we now
13 If all households faced the same marginal tax rate and there were no allowances, the income
compression measure would be equal to the marginal tax rate.
14 Results for mean marginal tax rates are reported in Grant and Koeniger (2008). We also checked
whether our results are robust if we use several other measures. We constructed a measure of income
compression using the Gini coefficient rather than the standard deviation. This measure is constructed
as Moreover, we experimented1Gini (income  tax liability  transfers )/Gini (income ).st ist ist ist st ist
with an inverse poverty index, which was defined as one minus the proportion of households whose
after-tax-and-transfer income is below half the median. Finally, we also experimented with an income
compression measure based on standard deviations of the log of net or gross income. The results
are similar when using these measures of the tax and transfer system.
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give a brief overview of consumer bankruptcy law and the changes in the ex-
emptions over time. Bankruptcy in the United States is regulated by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which allows individuals from nonfarming households
to file for personal bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Under
Chapter 7 of the act, the debtor has all his unsecured debts expunged (except
alimony, child support, taxes, and student debts) but must surrender all his assets
except those (deemed by the court) necessary for him to make his fresh start.
These necessary assets are the exemption, with assets exceeding this value being
sold and the excess amount used to satisfy the debt. Under Chapter 13, the
debtor agrees to a repayment schedule for part or all of the debt but retains his
assets. Crucially, the debtor could choose between Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 and
thus could never be made to pay more than could be enforced under Chapter
7. This means that the Chapter 7 exemptions place an upper limit on the amount
of unsecured debt that creditors can recover through the courts.15
Table 4 shows that the 1978 act allowed the house or homestead to be exempt
up to the value of $7,500, while other exempt assets included a car of $1,200,
household goods up to $200 for each item, jewelry up to $500, other property
up to $400 (and any unused homestead exemption), and tools of trade up to
$750.16 If filing jointly for bankruptcy, federal law allowed the husband and the
wife to each claim every exemption. The level of these exemptions has been
revised periodically since 1978. The 1984 reform introduced an upper limit on
the total value of exempt household goods and reduced the amount of unused
homestead exemption that could be claimed for other goods, while the 1994
revision doubled the dollar amounts in each category.17
Because bankruptcy had traditionally been regulated by individual states, the
1978 act allowed states to replace the federal exemption levels with their own.
All other aspects of the bankruptcy law, however, were uniform across states.
Similar to the federal exemptions, most states specify a variety of goods that are
exempt from seizure or forced sale, and some explicitly disallow the federal
exemptions. Table 5 lists the state laws that define which assets are exempt, where
these laws and the changes are taken from each state’s annotated state code and
from primary legislation.18 The table shows that bankruptcy exemption levels
change over time, albeit less frequently than taxes and transfers.
15 Around 70 percent of personal bankruptcy cases resulted in a Chapter 7 filing. However, several
courts preferred the debtor to file under Chapter 13, often enforcing purely nominal repayment
schedules.
16 This last item refers to work material or assets needed in order to practice professionally (some
jurisdictions allowed this category to include transport to and from work). Throughout the analysis,
we exclude the tools-of-trade exemption since it applies mostly to self-employed households, which
are excluded from our sample. Including that exemption in our analysis does not substantively
change the results.
17 The most recent legislation, passed in 2003, lies outside our sample period and hence is not
discussed.
18 Hynes, Malani, and Posner (2004) show that the different levels of bankruptcy exemptions across
U.S. states in the 1970s–1990s are highly correlated with their historic levels in 1920. These permanent
differences across states are controlled for by the state fixed effects in our regressions.
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Table 4
Chapter 7 Exemptions under the Federal Bankruptcy Act
Exemption Amount ($) Comments
1978:
House 7,500
Car 1,200
Household goods No limit on aggregate amount that can be
claimed under this category
Jewelry 500 Personal use only
Other property Allowed all of unclaimed exemption from the
house
Tools of trade 750 Items needed for job
1984 Revision:
Household goods 4,000 $200 Each item (furnishings, goods, clothes,
appliances, books, animals, musical
instruments) for personal use only
Other property 400 $3,750 Of the homestead exemption that is
unused
1994 Revision:
House 15,000
Car 2,400
Household goods 8,000 $400 Each item
Jewelry 1,000
Other property 800 $7,500 Of the homestead exemption that is
unused
Tools of trade 1,500
1998 Revision:
House 16,150
Car 2,575
Household goods 8,625 $425 Each item
Jewelry 1,075
Other property 850 $8,075 Of the homestead exemption that is
unused
Tools of trade 1,625
2001 Revision:
House 17,425
Car 2,775
Household goods 9,300 $450 Each item
Jewelry 1,150 Personal use only
Other property 925 $8,725 Of the homestead exemption that is
unused
Tools of trade 1,750
Source. Authors’ compilation using 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 522(d).
Note. Section 104 of the U.S. Code specifies that the amounts are to be updated with the inflation rate
every 3 years, commencing April 1, 1998. While not recorded, the federal legislation also allowed (with
some limits) insurance policies, pensions and annuities, social security payments, and awards adjudicated
by the courts to be exempted.
Table 3 displays some of the differences in exemption levels in the largest
states for single filers in 1984 and in 1998. Many states allowed larger exemptions
for couples, for older households, and for households with dependents. The table
shows that the homestead was fully exempt from seizure in Florida and Texas
(subject to an acreage limit). Moreover, in Texas in 1998, $30,000 worth of other
assets were exempt, with the amount being doubled for couples filing jointly.
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Table 5
Laws and Changes in Bankruptcy Exemptions
State Annotated State Code Changes Fed
Federal 11-522(d) 1984, 1994, 1998, 2001
California 704.010, 704.020, 704.030, 704.040,
704.060, 704.080, 704.730
1982, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990,
1995, 1997, 2003 No
Colorado 13-54-102, 13-54-107, 38-41-201 1981, 1985, 1991, 2000 No
Florida 222.05, 222.25, Constitution 10-4 No
Georgia 44-13-1, 44-13-100 1981, 2001 No
Illinois 735-5/12-901, 735-5/12-1001 1982 No
735-5/12-1201
Maryland 11-504 1982, 1983, 1989 No
Massachusetts 188-1, 235-35 1983, 1985, 2000 Yes
Michigan 600.6023 Yes
Minnesota 510.01, 510.02, 550.37 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992,
1993, 1994, 1996, 1998 Yes
Missouri 513.427, 513.430, 513.440, 513.475 1982, 1993, 2003 No
New Jersey 2A:17-19, 2A:26-4 Yes
New York CVP-52-5205, CVP-52-5206, DCD-
10a-282, DCD-10a-283, DCD-
10a-284
1982
No
Ohio 2329.66, 2329.662 No
Pennsylvania 8123, 8124 Yes
Texas 41.001-41.005, 42.001-42.005 1991 Yes
Virginia 34-3.1, 34.3.4, 34-26 1990 No
Washington 6-13-030, 6-13-020, 6-15-010 1983, 1987, 1991, 1999, 2003 Yes
Wisconsin 815.18, 815.20 1986, 1990 Yes
Source. Authors’ compilation using 11 U.S.C.A. sec. 522(d) and annotated state codes.
Note. An alternative system that substitutes for federal exemptions is available in California. “Fed” indicates
whether the federal bankruptcy code was allowed.
In Florida, in contrast, the corresponding exemption was up to $1,000 worth
of personal property and a car worth up to $1,000, and households in Florida
were not allowed to claim the federal exemptions. Minnesota allowed the home-
stead to be fully exempt in 1984 but later changed this to a maximum value of
$200,000. The other exemptions increased from $6,500 to $11,050 during the
same period (Minnesotan exemptions are adjusted in line with the retail price
index every 2 years). Other states, such as Pennsylvania, set the exemption level
much lower. In Pennsylvania, only $300 of property was exempt from seizure
(although clothing was also exempt), but households could claim the federal
exemptions, and obviously households would prefer to do so in this state. Mary-
land instead set a low bankruptcy exemption (the housing exemption was $2,500,
and the other exemptions were $3,500) and did not allow households to claim
the federal exemption. Maryland reduced the housing exemption in 1983 from
the higher value of $3,500. Unless explicitly prohibited by state law, the debtor
could choose between the federal and state exemptions, naturally choosing the
larger exemption.
Table 5 shows that, for example, Massachusetts changed the level of the ex-
emptions in 1983, 1985, and 2000, while the exemptions did not change in
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Michigan. However, Michigan allowed the more generous federal exemptions to
apply to Michigan residents, and these federal exemptions changed in 1984,
1994, 1998, and 2001. Thus, the exemptions that any household could claim
changed at some point in almost all states in the sample, and in some states
they changed many times (eight changes occurred in California and nine in
Minnesota).
The courts, in most cases, have allowed each debtor to rearrange his portfolio
of assets prior to default and substitute exempt for nonexempt assets.19 Since
there is considerable scope for substituting between assets when filing for bank-
ruptcy, we added the exemptions together (excluding the tools-of-trade exemp-
tion) to construct a total nominal value of the exemption for each household.
This value takes account of household characteristics such as marital status and
whether the household would be better off claiming the federal exemption,
should state law allow this. Since a household is allowed to claim the housing
exemption only if it owns its house (either outright or through a mortgage), we
added the homestead exemption to the exemption on all other assets only if a
household owns its home.20 Finally, we normalize the exemptions, dividing by
the average income in each state-year cell, to measure the generosity of the
exemptions in terms of mean income.
Bankruptcy exemptions have been shown to be important for the behavior
of U.S. households. The portfolio of many U.S. households includes unsecured
debt and positive asset holdings in more or less liquid form. On the basis of
the Federal Reserve Board’s 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, for example,
White (1998) computes that 15 percent of households could have increased their
net worth in 1995 if they had filed for bankruptcy. In this paper we are interested
in quantifying the amount of consumption insurance provided by these
exemptions.
Following this discussion of bankruptcy law and of taxes and transfers, we
now use the constructed data set that contains consumption, consumption
growth, bankruptcy exemption levels, and redistribution through taxes and trans-
fers for households in 18 U.S. states during the period 1980–2003.
4. Econometric Specification
We estimate two different sets of equations. First, we estimate the relationship
between bankruptcy exemption levels and our measures for tax and transfer
redistribution to see whether these two policies are negatively correlated. We
19 While there is a “substantially abuse” clause in the regulations, households were able to exploit
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act without regard to whether the household was genuinely unable
to pay or to whether repayment would result in substantial hardship.
20 A more detailed assessment of the household’s asset position is not possible because of limited
information in the CEX. If no specific upper exemption limit was defined for a category of nonhousing
goods (for instance, Pennsylvania allowed “all necessary wearing apparel”), we assigned the maximum
exemption level for that good in those jurisdictions that had a limit (see Grant 2008). In contrast,
we add a dummy to the regression if the housing exemption had no limit.
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then investigate whether this negative correlation can be rationalized by the
consumption insurance that both taxes and transfers and the bankruptcy ex-
emptions provide. For these regressions we compute the standard deviations of
log consumption and of consumption growth in order to measure consumption
insurance for each of the 420 state-year cells in our sample.21
We now discuss the econometric specification, using the regressions for con-
sumption insurance that take the form
y p b  b t  b x  b x  f   , (1)st 0 1 st 2 1st 3 2st s st
where s is the state, t is the year, measures redistribution through the tax andtst
transfer system, is the bankruptcy exemption, is a dummy for the un-x x1st 2st
limited homestead exemption, and denotes the dependent variable. The erroryst
is composed of a state fixed effect and an idiosyncratic component .22 Thef s st
state fixed effects capture fixed differences over time in within-state consumption
inequality: they control for all remaining unobserved heterogeneity across states
that is not accounted for by the policy variables. For instance, in the regression
using the standard deviation of consumption growth rates, including state fixed
effects controls for differences across states in the variance of permanent income
shocks. Thus, the coefficients of interest are estimated using changes in states
over time rather than differences across states. The state fixed effects are estimated
by including state dummies in the regression, so consistent estimation of b0, b1,
b2, and b3 requires a large number of time periods.
Including state fixed effects in the regression implies that b3, the coefficient
of the dummy for an unlimited homestead exemption, is identified only from
states where this variable changed. In the data this happened only once, when
Minnesota abolished the unlimited homestead exemption in 1993 and replaced
it with a homestead exemption of $200,000. Hence, including this variable in
the regressions is equivalent to inserting a dummy for pre-1993 Minnesota, so
the coefficient on the unlimited homestead exemption dummy is not well iden-
tified. Thus, we do not place much emphasis on interpreting the estimate of b3.
5. Results
In Table 6 and Table 7 we display the main results of interest in this paper.
Table 6 investigates the correlation between the bankruptcy exemptions and the
tax and transfer system, while Table 7 shows how both redistribution through
taxes and transfers and the bankruptcy exemptions are associated with the stan-
dard deviation of consumption and consumption growth. These results shed
21 As mentioned above, limited data availability does not allow an analysis at the household level.
For additional results that show that the bankruptcy exemptions are positively associated with a
household’s unsecured debts, see Grant and Koeniger (2008). Redistributive taxes and transfers instead
have no significant effect. Since the results are similar to those reported by Gropp, Scholz, and White
(1997), they are omitted here for brevity.
22 Note that the between-state variation affects the mean level of consumption and hence is removed
when constructing the standard deviation of consumption (or consumption growth) in each cell.
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light on whether both policies are imperfect substitutes in providing some con-
sumption insurance.
5.1. Redistributive Taxes and Bankruptcy Exemptions
Table 6 displays estimates for the association between bankruptcy exemptions
and redistributive taxes and transfers. In column 1, we regress the exemption
level on the income compression measure including a set of state dummies and
a dummy for unlimited homestead exemptions.23 We find that the coefficient of
the income compression measure is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level. The coefficient in column 1 implies that a change in income compression
from the least to the most generous level would be associated with a lower
exemption level of roughly $10,000 in 1984 prices.
One concern with the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions is that redis-
tribution through taxes and transfers, measured by the income compression
measure, may be endogenous. Thus, we check the robustness of our results if
we instrument that measure. We experiment with two possible instrument sets.
First, we use the 2-period lag of the income compression measure. Second, we
use a set of six instruments containing political variables (the political affiliation
of the state governor and the state legislature and the proportion of voters in a
state voting Democratic rather than Republican in presidential elections), per
capita gross domestic produce in each state, and two measures of how effective
the state is at raising tax revenue (the tax fiscal capacity and the tax intensity
or effort in each period). For the years up to 1991, data on these last two variables
are available from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
([ACIR] 1993), while subsequent data are taken from Tannenwald (2002) and
Tannenwald and Turner (2004), although it was necessary to linearly interpolate
the two series for some years. Unfortunately, however, these data are not available
for the last 3 years in our sample. (See Tannenwald [2002] and Tannenwald and
Turner [2004] for a full discussion of the variables.)
The political variables make useful instruments because they reflect tastes for
taxes and redistribution. The ACIR measures are an even more natural instru-
ment, as they measure how efficient the state is at raising tax revenue. The ACIR
index is higher if a given marginal tax rate raises more income from households
(accounting for the cost of raising the revenue and the amount of revenue that
is raised). Alternatively, it takes less effort to raise a fixed proportion of income.
A state that is less efficient at raising tax revenue may resort to a generous
bankruptcy exemption rather than attempt to increase redistribution through
the tax and benefit system. Thus, the instruments predict the extent of redis-
tribution through taxes and transfers but may not affect current exemptions
directly. The latter is plausible for two reasons: exemptions do not directly affect
the state budget constraint, and changes in the exemptions take longer to im-
23 As we state above, in our regressions with state fixed effects, this is equivalent to including a
dummy for Minnesota before 1993 (which limited the housing exemption in that year).
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Table 6
Relationship between Taxes or Transfers and Bankruptcy Exemptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income compression .049** .316** .269** .234**
(.016) (.119) (.071) (.034)
Constant .069** .161** .139** .128**
(.007) (.040) (.024) (.012)
Instrumental variables . . . Lag Pol1 Pol2
Rank test . . . 5.45 4.98 6.94
. . . [.000] [.000] [.000]
Sargan . . . . . . 2.965 42.78
. . . . . . [.085] [.000]
N 420 384 358 358
R2 .746 . . . . . . . . .
Note. The dependent variable is bankruptcy exemptions. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for
clustering by state. Values in square brackets are probabilities. ”Lag” denotes the regression in which we
instrument by the 2-period lag, “Pol1” denotes the regression in which we use only the political affiliation
of the state legislature and the tax efficiency index as instruments, and “Pol2” denotes the regression in
which the full set of instruments is used. All regressions included a set of state dummies and a dummy
for unlimited homestead exemptions.
** p ! .01.
plement than do taxes or transfers, which depend on the state budget that is
decided every year.24
Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 6 display the results when we instrument the
income compression measure with its 2-period lag or with the political variables.
The results are qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates in column 1, as the
coefficient of the income compression measure remains negative and significant
at the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient is larger when we
instrument. Note that in column 2 we use only a restricted set of political
instruments (including a measure for whether the state legislature was Republican
or Democrat and the tax efficiency measure), whereas we use the full set of
political variables as instruments in column 4. The restricted set of instruments
is a natural subset since state legislatures must explicitly pass the state budget
and the tax efficiency measure captures the cost of raising a particular amount
of taxes. As displayed in Table 6, the rank test for the significance of the in-
struments in the first-stage regression is passed for both the restricted and full
instrument sets. The Sargan test rejects the overidentifying restrictions for the
full instrument set but not for the restricted set of instruments, where the relevant
critical values are obtained from the x2(5) and x2(1) distributions, respectively.
Overall, the association between bankruptcy exemptions and redistribution
through taxes and transfers is negative and robust. The implied elasticity (cal-
culated at the mean) is .09 when we use the estimates in column 2. We now
investigate whether this negative correlation can be rationalized by the con-
sumption insurance that both policies provide.
24 An exception is the automatic update of exemptions due to inflation that the federal government
and some states implement at regular intervals.
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Table 7
Effect of Taxes and Bankruptcy Exemptions on Consumption Insurance
SD( )cit
(1)
SD(D )cit
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Income compression .076 .254** .961 .743** .211
(.050) (.083) (.495) (.229) (.247)
Exemption .047** .066** .093** .055 .039
(.014) (.024) (.033) (.034) (.033)
Unlimited homestead dummy .148** .108 .118 .014 .006
(.051) (.084) (.096) (.127) (.083)
Constant .856** .719** .945** .729** .448**
(.067) (.113) (.218) (.179) (.122)
Time dummies No No No No Yes
Instrumental variables . . . . . . Lag Pol . . .
Rank test . . . . . . 5.45 6.94 . . .
. . . . . . [.000] [.000] . . .
Sargan . . . . . . . . . 10.77 . . .
. . . . . . . . . [.056] . . .
N 420 412 384 358 412
R2 .143 .091 . . . . . . . . .
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for clustering by state. Values in square brackets are
probabilities. All regressions included a full set of state dummies. “Lag” denotes the regression in which
we instrument by the 2-period lag, and “Pol” denotes the regression that uses a set of political instruments.
Significance levels are denoted by p ! .10.
** Significance levels are denoted by p ! .01.
5.2. Consumption Insurance
First we estimate how redistribution through bankruptcy exemptions or taxes
and transfers is related to consumption inequality. In the second step, we relate
both policies to the inequality of consumption growth, our preferred measure
of consumption insurance since it is purged of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
5.2.1. Consumption Inequality
Table 7, column 1, reports the estimation results for consumption inequality
(the standard deviation of log consumption is the dependent variable), where
the estimates rely on changes within states since the specification includes state
dummies. Recall that market completeness would imply that neither the tax and
transfer system nor bankruptcy exemptions should be significant in these re-
gressions. Instead, we find that both the income compression measure and bank-
ruptcy exemptions enter negatively (as predicted if both policies provide con-
sumption insurance in incomplete markets), where the coefficient of bankruptcy
exemptions is significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient of the income
compression measure is not significant. The coefficient of the unlimited home-
stead exemption is negative and significant (although it is identified only by the
1993 Minnesota reform).
The estimates in column 1 suggest that a change from having the least to the
most income compression in our sample would explain one-tenth of the dif-
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ferences in within-state consumption inequality of the states in our sample. (Our
estimates say nothing about between-state inequality, which would be reflected
in differences in the mean of consumption across states.) Instead, a change from
the smallest to the largest exemption level could explain about one-quarter of
the differences in within-state consumption inequality. In terms of elasticities
(calculated at the mean), the estimates imply that the standard deviation of log
consumption would fall by .3 percent or .6 percent if the income compression
measure or bankruptcy exemptions increased by 10 percent, respectively.
The coefficient estimate is sizeable but not implausible, even though currently
only 1.5 percent of U.S. households formally file for bankruptcy each year. First,
we have deliberately chosen rather homogeneous groups to construct our sample
(we have removed the self-employed, farmers, heads of households over age 60
and under age 30, for example), and for the selected sample the cross-sectional
variation in consumption is likely to be smaller than in the general population.
That is, the fraction of explained variation is larger since we remove much of
the variation due to differences in the underlying populations in the various
states from the denominator. Second, although only 1.5 percent of households
file for bankruptcy, substantially more households default on their debts—and
bankruptcy legislation is relevant for these households since it sets the punish-
ment they would receive if they were pursued. Moreover, around 23 percent of
households in our sample receive public transfers. This means that many house-
holds directly benefit from the redistribution that results from the two policies.
Third, people who do not receive transfers and do not default are still affected
by the legislation since they pay higher taxes and more interest. Last, if precau-
tionary motives matter, then the consumption behavior of all households is
affected by the insurance that the two policies provide.
5.2.2. Consumption Growth Inequality
As mentioned above, the inequality in consumption growth better measures
the pure insurance effect of both policies, and this insurance effect is funda-
mentally what is of interest to us. In particular, differences in consumption
growth are not affected by ex ante heterogeneity in consumption. Columns 2–5
of Table 7 thus report results for regressions with the standard deviation of
consumption growth as dependent variable. In the OLS regression in column
2, the coefficients for the income compression measure and bankruptcy exemp-
tions are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient for the
unlimited homestead exemption, while no longer significant, remains negative.
In terms of elasticities (calculated at the mean), the estimates imply that the
standard deviation of consumption growth would fall by 1.6 percent or 1.2
percent if the income compression measure or bankruptcy exemptions increased
by 10 percent, respectively.
The results reported in column 5 show that the coefficient estimates of the
income compression measure and the exemptions are robust and remain eco-
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nomically significant if we add time dummies. Not surprisingly, the significance
of the estimates decreases in this case because of the smaller remaining data
variation.25
Another concern with the OLS regressions is that taxes or transfers and income
or consumption shocks may be codetermined. For example, a state productivity
shock is likely to affect the state’s budget (and hence tax requirements). Given
that the budget and thus taxes and transfers are decided regularly, they might
respond to year-to-year changes in business conditions in the state. We thus
instrument the income compression measure but treat bankruptcy exemptions
as predetermined since they change less frequently and do not directly affect the
state budget.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 report results when the income compression
measure is instrumented with its 2-period lag and the full set of political variables,
respectively. In all cases the rank test for the significance of the instruments in
the first regression stage is passed at conventional significance levels. Moreover,
we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions for the set of political variables
as the Sargan test is passed (where the critical value is obtained from the x2(5)
distribution).
In column 3, the coefficients of the income compression measure and the
bankruptcy exemption are significant, and both are negatively associated with
the standard deviation of consumption growth, as predicted by our hypothesis.
The same holds for the estimation results in column 4 except that the coefficient
of bankruptcy exemptions is less significant.
The point estimates imply that both policies have an effect of similar size (that
is, exemptions no longer have a larger effect as in the regressions with the standard
deviation of consumption levels in column 1), with changes from the least to
most generous U.S. state implying a reduction of around a quarter of a standard
deviation in the inequality of consumption growth rates in each case. This effect
is sizeable but plausible for the reasons mentioned above. The estimates imply
that a 1 percent increase in the income compression measure has the same effect
as an increase of exemptions of about $6,500 in 1984 prices.
6. Conclusion
We have argued that both bankruptcy exemptions and redistributive taxes and
transfers provide some consumption insurance in incomplete markets. We have
searched for empirical support using data on U.S. states in the period 1980–2003.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we have found (1) that the extent of redistributive
taxes or transfers and the size of the bankruptcy exemption level are negatively
correlated and (2) that both redistributive taxation and bankruptcy exemptions
are negatively associated with the inequality of consumption and of consumption
growth.
25 The estimates for the specification in column 1 are also robust to the inclusion of time dummies.
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These results relate to Fisher (2005), which finds that the generosity of un-
employment insurance is negatively correlated with the incidence of bankruptcy
and argues that this may occur since both policies provide insurance to house-
holds. We have provided evidence that supports this hypothesis, where we relate
a more general measure for redistribution through taxes and transfers and bank-
ruptcy exemptions to the extent of consumption smoothing in U.S. states.
Our results suggest that the negative correlation of redistributive taxation and
personal bankruptcy regulation in the U.S. states can be explained by a simple
economic mechanism. Clearly, redistributive taxation also depends on other
determinants that are not related to consumption smoothing and insurance. In
this respect, it is surprising and interesting to find that the negative correlation
between both policies is borne out in the data. Although normative conclusions
cannot be drawn with the currently available data, the results of the regressions
with instrumental variables suggest that there might be an interesting policy
trade-off in that bankruptcy exemptions are less effective in increasing consumer
welfare if redistribution through taxes and transfers is more generous. Such a
trade-off is relevant not only for U.S. states but also for many other developed
countries. As surveyed by Tabb (2005), many European countries with substantial
public welfare programs, such as France and Germany, have recently introduced
legislation that allows consumers to declare bankruptcy. Given the trade-off we
investigate, the additional insurance provided by these reforms may not be im-
portant since welfare spending is already substantial in these European countries.
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